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A B S T R A C T
There is limited knowledge on the extent to which scientists may strategically respond to metrics by adopting
questionable practices, namely practices that challenge the scientific ethos, and the individual and contextual
factors that affect their likelihood. This article aims to fill these gaps by studying the opportunistic use of self-
citations, i.e. citations of one’s own work to boost metric scores. Based on sociological and economic literature
exploring the factors driving scientists’ behaviour, we develop hypotheses on the predictors of strategic increase
in self-citations. We test the hypotheses in the Italian Higher Education system, where promotion to professorial
positions is regulated by a national habilitation procedure that considers the number of publications and cita-
tions received. The sample includes 886 scientists from four of science’s main disciplinary sectors, employs
different metrics approaches, and covers an observation period beginning in 2002 and ending in 2014. We find
that the introduction of a regulation that links the possibility of career advancement to the number of citations
received is related to a strong and significant increase in self-citations among scientists who can benefit the most
from increasing citations, namely assistant professors, associate professors and relatively less cited scientists, and
in particular among social scientists. Our findings suggest that while metrics are introduced to spur virtuous
behaviours, when not properly designed they favour the usage of questionable practices.
1. Introduction
The practice of allocating resources and linking career advancement
to research productivity is intended to break the old-boys network and
promote meritocracy in academia. Yet in recent years concern has
grown over the downsides of the resulting pressure to publish. Studies
have shown that the ‘publish or perish’ culture and the use of metrics
for research evaluation can have several detrimental effects, like the
promotion of strategic game-playing and the decline of shared in-
formation (Anderson et al., 2007), a decrease in creativity (Azoulay
et al., 2011; Heinze et al., 2009), an increase in plagiarism (Honig and
Bedi, 2012), a surge in the production of redundant publications
(Jefferson 1998), fads (Van Dalen and Klamer, 2005) and elitist re-
search topics that are detached from practical and societal concerns (De
Rond and Miller, 2005); they also discourage non-paradigmatic or a-
theoretical research, and favour ex-post hypothesizing (Miller, 2007),
inflate the number of submissions (Franzoni et al., 2011), reduce the
appearance of negative results (Fanelli, 2012), and promote the emer-
gence of predatory journals (Xia et al., 2015).
The traditional belief that malpractice and misbehaviour are due to
scientists who are not sufficiently socialized into the norms of science,
e.g. junior researchers, is challenged by survey results suggesting that
malpractice is rather common (Bedeian et al., 2010; Martinson et al.,
2005) and retractions related to scientific misconduct is growing
(Steen, 2010; Fang et al., 2012). Some scholars argue that due to aca-
demic competition and the use of performance indicators, an increasing
number of scientists may be changing the conception of what con-
stitutes appropriate research behaviour (Martin, 2013) by engaging in
questionable practices to the point that they become embedded in the
professional academic culture (Edwards and Roy, 2017).
However, despite evidence on the unintended effects of the pressure
to publish, it is not yet clear the extent to which scientists adopt
questionable practices as a strategic response to metrics (Fang et al.,
2012). Moreover, we have little knowledge of what individual and
contextual factors affect the likelihood of such behaviours among in-
dividual scientists (de Rijcke et al., 2016), and whether there are any
disciplinary variations or not.
This article addresses these gaps by studying the behaviour of
Italian academics in response to the introduction of a national habili-
tation procedure that regulates the promotion to professorial positions.
While metrics have been employed for institutional evaluation and to
inform decisions on individual career paths, this procedure directly links
the possibility to become an associate professor and a full professor to
the number of publications and citations (Marini, 2016). Hence, doing
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well according to the metrics is a pre-condition for moving up the
academic career ladder. In particular we study the use of self-citations,
i.e. citations to one’s own work, as a shortcut to boost metric scores. We
focus on the practice of inflating self-citations, for they represent a
typology of the emerging ‘post-production misconducts’ aimed at en-
hancing a publication’s impact; while these misconducts do not gen-
erate false results, they nevertheless erode the credibility of the pub-
lication system (Biagioli, 2016). Moreover, inflating self-citations is at
odds with the norm of disinterestedness that is central to the ethos of
science (Merton, 1973). As such, opportunistic self-citations can signal
that the norms of the scientific community are not effectively guarded,
which is possibly conducive to increasing the number and severity of
infringements.1 Finally, self-citations can be exploited in a rather short
period of time, by adding citations to the articles in the pipeline –
meaning that an increase in self-citations can be easily detected.
Therefore, self-citations represent a fast and visible indication on the
extent to which scientists can opportunistically respond to the use of
citations to drive career decisions, not to mention their role as a pre-
cious ‘canary in a coal mine’.2
We build on sociological and economic studies of science to develop
hypotheses on the factors that drive scientists to increase self-citations
in response to the introduction of metrics-based career decision-
making. We test the hypotheses considering the scientific production of
886 scientists from four disciplinary sectors from science’s main re-
search areas, which employed different metrics approaches, within an
observation period that began in 2002 and ended in 2014.
In Section 2 we review the literature on the drivers of scientists’
behaviour, and develop hypotheses on the adoption of questionable
practices, namely increasing self-citations in response to metrics-based
habilitation procedures. In Section 3 we present the data and method,
while the empirical analysis is presented in Section 4. In the final sec-
tion we discuss the article’s main findings, the theoretical and policy
implications, and advance proposals to counteract some of the poten-
tially unintended effects of using of metrics.
2. Strategic responses to metrics
2.1. Quantitative indicators for research evaluation
In recent decades, quantitative indicators have proliferated and are
widely used to assess scientific output, to drive the allocation of funds,
and for the hiring and promotion of staff (Miller et al., 2005; Van Fleet
et al., 2000; Harzing, 2010; Lissoni et al., 2011; de Rijcke et al., 2016).
In parallel to their diffusion, a debate emerged regarding their con-
ceptual and empirical validity as well as their unintended effects
(MacRoberts and MacRoberts 1989; Garfield, 2003; Costas and
Bordons, 2007). The use of indicators is based on the assumption that
publications and the citations received are proxies of a scientist’ con-
tribution to the advancement of science (Merton, 1988; Moed, 2005;
Haustein and Larivière, 2015). A crucial issue, therefore, is whether
these indicators are reliable proxies or not.
In the case of publications, scientific journals must closely assess
whether an article merits publishing, as the selection of low quality
articles would endanger their reputation. On the other hand scholars
have criticized the use of a journal impact factor as a proxy for the
quality of articles, because the correlation between a journal impact
factor and the citations received by an individual article is very low
(Lozano et al., 2012).
For citations, scientists judge whether a published contribution is
useful and necessary to be cited; for self-citations, an author assesses
whether her/his past works were relevant when citing the article. In the
case of citations and self-citations, there are slight gains or losses de-
pending on whether authors are truthful or not. In fact, despite most
scholars believing that citation counts are a poor representation of
scientific contribution (Saha et al., 2003; Aksnes and Rip, 2009), at the
article level there is evidence of a positive correlation between citation
rates and qualitative judgement by peers (Cole and Cole, 1974;
Zuckerman, 1987; Aksnes, 2006).
However, employing quantitative indicators for allocating resources
or making decisions on careers enhances the risk that they become
unreliable. In the case of publications, for instance, predatory journals,
which do not have a reputation to protect and exchange publications
for money, have emerged. In case of citations, the likelihood of a de-
ceptive citation arguably grows with the proximity between the citing
and the cited authors, as they can more easily collude and produce so-
called citation rings. In the case of self-citations, the citing and cited
authors are the same person, and so the risk that citations are aimed to
game the system of indicators is even higher. Despite such limitations,
there is no consensus on whether self-citations should be excluded for
the sake of research evaluation, and only recently have some experts
explicitly suggested their removal (Wouters et al., 2015).
2.2. Strategic responses to metrics
The response of scientists to metrics arguably depends on their
motivations for action.
Classical sociological accounts depicted scientists’ behaviour as
being driven by the enjoyment derived from solving ‘puzzles’ as well as
by the recognition from peers for achieving a discovery (Eiduson, 1962;
Hagstrom, 1965). The scientists’ social context was perceived as being
dominated by an ethos of science – characterized by prescriptions of
communalism, universalism, disinterestedness and organized scepti-
cism (Merton, 1973; Hagstrom 1974; Zuckerman, 1977). Overall, sci-
entists’ motivations and the normative environment contributed to the
efficiency of the scientific enterprise. Post-World War II research po-
licies in Western countries developed under similar beliefs that scien-
tists, left free to pursue their curiosity, would naturally provide the
knowledge that a nation needed (Bush, 1945).
While sharing the importance of curiosity and peers’ recognition,
since the early nineties economists have argued that scientists are also
interested in more mundane returns, namely money, and that their
behaviour is not merely driven by ethical concerns, but that they are
strategic in pursuing their goals (Levin and Stephan, 1991; Stephan,
1996). In a similar period, research policies have increasingly aimed to
increase efficiency and performance through competition and the as-
sessment of results (Auranen and Nieminen, 2010). Therefore, at least
implicitly, policies have also experienced a similar shift in their as-
sumptions about what drives scientists’ behaviours, e.g. assuming that
they are not necessarily interested in their own job and must therefore
be spurred via incentives and controls.
Different perspectives on the nature of scientists lead to different
interpretations and expectations on the adoption of questionable
practices. Consistently with a Mertonian view of an ethical and disin-
terested scientist, early studies tended to blame the individual.
Offenders were described as a few black sheep with peculiar psycho-
logical profiles, affected by anomie or alienation (Anderson et al., 1994;
Hackett 1994). Adopting a more strategic perspective, subsequent stu-
dies paid attention to systemic, undesirable behaviours induced by an
improper system of incentives (Stephan, 2012). Franzoni et al. (2011),
1 Such a mechanism is central in the “broken windows theory”, which states that when
people observe that others violate a certain norm or rule, they are more likely to violate
other norms or rules, which causes violations to spread (Wilson and Kelling, 1982; Keizer
et al., 2008).
2 The expression describes an item that serves as an early indicator for a coming greater
danger. It alludes to the use of caged canaries that miners carried into mines, and if
dangerous gases collected, the canary was killed, thus warning the miners to exit im-
mediately.
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for instance, found that the number of submissions to Science increased
significantly in countries that introduced monetary incentives for
publications, but the rate of acceptance decreased, so that in turn the
effect was only to overload the review process. Practices that are
counterproductive or indifferent in terms of achieving priority in a
discovery are often adopted because they are valuable tools for in-
creasing a scientist’s metric scores. For instance, ‘cutting’ a scientific
result into many works is profitable in terms of the number of articles
and citations received, compared to presenting them in one work
(Bornmann and Daniel, 2007), publication strategies become less se-
lective and more specialized in order to maximise scores in bibliometric
indicators (Costas and Bordons, 2007; Leahey, 2007).
This empirical evidence suggests that the use of citations for driving
decisions on careers will affect the behaviour of a (strategic) scientist.
Hence, we formulate the hypothesis that:
Hypothesis 1. Scientists that need to climb the career ladder – i.e.
assistant and associate professors – will respond to the use of citations
to guide career decisions by increasing the number of self-citations.
Moreover, since the gain from increasing citations is particularly
strong for scientists that are cited less frequently – as they will need to
reach their peers – therefore we expect that:
Hypothesis 2. Scientists that are cited less frequently than their peers
of the same rank and discipline are more likely to respond to the use of
citations to guide career decisions by increasing their number of self-
citations.
The social context in which scientists are embedded can also affect
scientists’ responses. In particular, Whitley (2007) argued that social
sciences and humanities are more prone to imitate research practices
and norms of dominant fields because they display a less cohesive social
structure and, as a consequence, the impact of evaluation systems will
be stronger. Some studies back this argument. Hammarfelt and de
Rijcke (2015) recently observed an increase in the number of journal
articles written in English – the typical output of science, technology,
engineering and mathematics – among scientists in the humanities, and
Aagaard et al. (2015) found that the Norwegian national indicator for
research evaluation is used more frequently at the individual level and
is more important for judging scholarly status in the humanities. Reale
and Seeber (2011) found that the introduction of a research assessment
exercise in Italy had a stronger effect on the research practices of
management scientists, than scientists in physics and biomedical sci-
ence, since the latter were already accustomed to considering the
number of articles appearing in international journals and citations as
proxies for scientific value. Hence, we formulate the hypothesis that:
Hypothesis 3. Scientists from social science disciplines are more likely
to respond to the use of citations to guide career decisions by increasing
their number of self-citations, when compared to scientists from natural
science and medical disciplines.
3. Data and methods
3.1. Context of analysis
We test the hypotheses in the context of Italian higher education.
This system is predominantly public, with almost 95% of academics
employed by public universities3 that are funded by the public’s purse
(ETER, 2014). In the past, Italian higher education was governed by a
centralized bureaucracy that exerted procedural control through laws
and regulations, and by powerful chairs, which had the power to make
decisions concerning academic issues and individual careers (Clark
1983; Pezzoni et al., 2012). From the mid-nineties, reforms loosely
inspired by the principles of New Public Management aimed to change
the governance of the system, from a steering “by law and regulation”
approach to a steering “by objective” approach, in which resource al-
location is driven by performance and universities gain more manage-
rial autonomy. Accordingly, decisions over careers moved from na-
tional to university-selected disciplinary committees. However, the
devolution of powers to the universities was not accompanied by a
strong enough system of accountability, and the distribution of re-
sources has remained weakly competitive (Reale and Seeber, 2011). In
this context, the number of citations and publications were not im-
portant criteria for promotion, and the recruitment procedures have
been increasingly criticized due to the alleged lack of meritocracy, the
high level of localism, and cases of cronyism and nepotism (Morano
Foadi, 2006; Durante et al., 2011).4
In order to address such criticisms, in late 2010 the government
introduced a national habilitation procedure regulating access to pro-
fessorial positions (Donina et al., 2015). Accordingly, disciplinary
committees can award the associate or full professor habilitation only if
the candidate meets at least two out of the three thresholds of pro-
ductivity. Two metric approaches could be adopted. In the so-called
bibliometric approach the candidate should outperform the median
productivity of the current body of associate or full professors in at least
two out of three productivity indicators: i) number of publications, ii)
number of citations received and iii) Hirsch index.5,6 In the so-called
non-bibliometric approach the number of citations are not considered as
a criterion, instead each committee sets distinct thresholds of pro-
ductivity in terms of a minimum number of publications in pre-defined
i) ‘first class’ and ii) ‘second class’ journals, as well as iii) number of
books.
In turn, the Italian habilitation procedure presents some features
that allow an exploration of strategic responses to metrics and the
adoption of questionable practices. First, while metrics have tradi-
tionally been used to support career decisions, the habilitation proce-
dure directly impacts the possibility of career advancement. Second, the
habilitation is applied at the system level and to all disciplines. Third,
the habilitation allows one to explore the effects of different metric
systems.
3.2. Sample
The construction of the sample was driven by empirical and theo-
retical considerations.
3.2.1. Level
From a disciplinary perspective, the Italian Higher Education system
is organized in 367 disciplinary sectors, nested in 188 recruitment
sectors, 88 macro-sectors and 14 macro-areas. The ‘recruitment sector’
is the level at which metrics are defined and habilitation awarded, and
therefore we focused on identifying an appropriate selection (from now
onward ‘discipline’).
3.2.2. Size
We selected disciplines with a size that is typical of the recruitment
sectors in the Italian Higher Education system (median of 241 mem-
bers), while avoiding disciplines that are too small as they could be
3 46,314 full time academics employed in public universities on total 48,881–year
2016 (Cineca – http://cercauniversita.cineca.it/php5/docenti/cerca.php).
4 In 2012, a survey of 4700 assistant professors found that career progression is re-
garded as solely based on merit only by 0.8% of the respondents, 18.4% considered it a
mix of merit and seniority, 19.5% considered the system based on established hierarchies
and personal relationships and 36.8% did not identify any criteria adopted (Monteleone
and Torrisi, 2012).
5 The definition of the Hirsch index – of H index – is that a scholar with an index of h
has published h papers each of which has been cited in other papers at least h times
(Hirsch, 2005)
6 The individual productivity scores are normalized by taking into consideration the
number of years from the first publication.
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problematic for the sake of statistical analysis. Further, we included the
entire population of scientists from a discipline in order to avoid the
possibility of a selection bias.
3.2.3. Data availability
We selected disciplines for which the majority of the research out-
come is covered by publication databases; hence, we excluded dis-
ciplines in arts and humanities, as the research production is pre-
dominantly in Italian and consists of books.
3.2.4. Disciplinary coverage
We sampled four disciplines from sciences’ major research areas,
namely Genetics (natural sciences), Psychiatry (medicine), Economic and
Managerial Engineering and Applied Economics (social sciences).
3.2.5. Metric approaches
Applied Economics adopts a non-bibliometric approach whereas
the other three disciplines adopt a bibliometric approach. The choice
of the two sectors in the social sciences aimed to recreate a (quasi)
experimental design, where an experimental group (Economic and
Managerial Engineering) is subjected to the experimental treatment
(the use of citations as a metric) and is compared with a control
group (Applied Economics) that does not receive the treatment (cita-
tions are not used as a metric). Quasi-experiments are subject to
concern regarding their internal validity when the treatment and
control groups are not comparable at baseline. Hence, we chose these
two sectors for they resemble each other in several instances. In
terms of composition, they both include, to a very large extent, sci-
entists with a background in Economics. In terms of publication
behaviour, scientists from the two disciplines: i) are similarly pro-
ductive: average of articles per year 2.24 in Applied Economics vs.
2.44 in Economic and Managerial Engineering; ii) they publish in
very similar outlets: only 13% of the articles in Applied Economics
are published in journals where scientists from Economic and
Managerial Engineering do not publish, and 37% when reversed; iii)
the level of collaboration is somewhat similar: the number of co-
authors per article is 2.73 in Applied Economics versus 3.13 in
Economic and Managerial Engineering; iv) until the introduction of
the habilitation procedure in 2010, the number of self-citations per
author-article was also very similar: 0.62 in Applied Economics vs.
0.60 in Economic and Managerial Engineering.7
We retrieved information on publications, citations, affiliations, and
the career evolution of the entire population of scientists from the four
disciplines, for a total of 886 academics, from 2002 to 2014.8 Data on
publications and citations were retrieved on August 2016 from the
Scopus database.9,10 Information on scientists’ careers and affiliations
were retrieved from the Cineca database.11
Table 1 presents the main characteristics of the selected recruitment
sectors.12
In the following paragraphs, we first describe the dependent vari-
able. Next, we introduce the variables that predict the propensity to
self-cite. Finally, we describe our main independent variables, which
predict the increase of self-citations in response to the use of citations to
guide career decisions.
3.3. Dependent variable
The dependent variable is a scientist’s average number of self-cita-
tions per article published in year i.13 Self-citations are defined as the
citations to the author(s) previous works included in the reference list
of the articles published in year i.
It is important to remark that an increase in self-citations might well
indicate that the scientist’s work tends to be related to her/hisprevious
work more so than in the past. However, a rapid increase in self-cita-
tions corresponding to the introduction of the habilitation procedure is
likely indicative of a strategic use of self-citations rather than a nar-
rowing research focus, because some years are arguably necessary to
change one’s way of doing research.
3.4. Variables predicting the number of self-citations
Some ‘baseline’ variables are expected to predict the number of self-
citations.
3.4.1. Past productivity
The number of publications co-authored in the past increases the
pool of articles that can be cited. Hence, a variable measures the cu-
mulative number of publications up to year i-1. At the same time, the
journals’ editors and reviewers can notice and criticize the inclusion of
many self-citations; some publishers even recommend that authors
“minimize self-citations” for the sake of preserving anonymity in the
peer review process.14 Therefore, it is more difficult for an author with
a large pool of past publications (e.g. 50) to self-cite a large share of
Table 1
Characteristics of the recruitment sectors.
Recruitment Sector Science’ Area Metric approach universities scientists (2014) publications (2002–2014)
Economic and Managerial Engineering Social Science Bibliometric 36 221 3429
Genetics Natural Science Bibliometric 42 260 5481
Psychiatry Medicine Bibliometric 38 258 10,271
Applied Economics Social Science Non-bibliometric 53 147 1384
169 886 20,565
7 No legal restriction exists on the number of disciplines a scientist can apply for ha-
bilitation, yet a scientist can be affiliated with only one discipline and in practice the
overwhelming majority of scientists’ careers occur within one single discipline. None of
the scientists in our sample has been affiliated to both disciplines in the considered
period.
8 We excluded year 2015, since on the date of the extraction, the information was not
yet complete. For each scientist we excluded years in which the person was not affiliated
with the recruitment sector.
9 The candidate can choose that the indexes are computed using either the Scopus or
Web of Science databases.
10 First we manually identified the Scopus ID of each scientist affiliated with the four
disciplines between 2002 and 2014. In order to check the right association and avoid
problems with homonyms, we manually checked whether the following elements mat-
ched: 1) the last and first name; 2) ORCID digital identifier, if any; 3) the correct uni-
versity and departmental affiliation name (controlling for changes over time). Next, we
collected the scientific products and the associated citation overview of each ID by using
an automatic approach.
11 Cineca is a non-profit consortium of Italian universities, national research centres,
and the Ministry of Universities and Research (MIUR), which is formally in charge of
collecting statistics on Italian Higher Education and research system.
12 Each of the four selected recruitment sectors includes only one disciplinary sector.
13 (Total number of self-citations made in year i)/(number of articles published in year
i).
14 For instance, see the authors’ guidelines from publisher Taylor and Francis, avail-
able at: http://www.tandf.co.uk/journals/pdf/Author/anonymous_peer_review.pdf.
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their own past publications, than an author with a smaller pool of
publications (e.g. five), as it is more acceptable to include, for example,
two self-citations rather than twenty self-citations. Hence, we introduce
a variable given by the square of the cumulative number of publications
up to year i-1 in order to consider the expected decreasing marginal
effect of an additional item in the pool of past publications.
3.4.2. Number of co-authors
One variable measures the average number of co-authors for a sci-
entist’s publications in year i. It can be expected that the larger the
number of co-authors in a publication, the lower the number of self-
citations that can be included for each of them. In fact, an article is
unlikely to be equally related to the work of all co-authors; it can be
very central to one co-authors’ agenda (e.g. the corresponding author)
and less central for the others. Hence, some co-authors may find much
of their own past work relevant, while others find few. The character-
istics of the scientist may also affect the propensity to self-cite.
3.4.3. Academic rank
Since self-citations can be used to increase prestige (Hutson, 2006)
and scientists with lower academic rankings may have a higher need to
affirm their status, meaning it is expected that assistant professors and
associate professors will cite their work more frequently than full pro-
fessors. A dummy variable considers the scientist’s academic rank in
year i, namely assistant professor (ricercatore), associate professor
(professore associato) and full professor (professore ordinario).
3.4.4. Citation standing
Scientists that receive many citations may be more confident re-
garding the relevance and value of their work, and therefore be more
prone to citing it. We introduce a variable given by the author’s cu-
mulative amount of citations received up to year i normalized by the
cumulative citations received up to year i by the median scientist of the
same rank and disciplinary group.
3.4.5. Gender
Three studies on self-citations explored gender variations and found
that male scientists are more prone to self-cite than female scientists
(Hutson, 2006; Maliniak et al., 2013; King et al., 2017). We therefore
include a dummy variable for a scientist’s gender.
3.4.6. Professional age
The propensity to cite one’s own work increases with the profes-
sional age of the author (Hutson, 2006). Possibly, this may reflect the
fact that senior academics are less prone to explore new areas of re-
search compared to their younger colleagues.
Additionally, the contextual characteristics of a scientist’s work can
affect the propensity to self-cite.
3.4.7. Group research quality
The level of competition for prestige can be stronger in high quality
groups. As a proxy for research quality, we consider the results of the
national research assessment exercise (VQR), which considered scien-
tific production from 2004 to 2010. In particular, the average evalua-
tion of the publications of a university in macro-area y normalized by
the average evaluation in macro area y.
3.5. Variables predicting the increase of self-citations
3.5.1. Habilitation
We expect the introduction of habilitation criteria considering the
number of citations to increase the propensity to self-cite. We construct
and separately test dummy variables for the years after the law was
issued.
3.5.2. The moderating effect of academic rank on habilitation
We test the moderating effect of academic rank on the habilitation
process to explore changes in the number of self-citations among as-
sistant and associate professors.
3.5.3. The moderating effect of the citation standing on habilitation
We test a moderating effect of the citation standing on the habili-
tation process to explore whether scientists that are less cited than their
peers of the same rank and discipline will increase the number of self-
citations at a higher rate.
3.5.4. Career prospects
We controlled for a competing explanation on the increase of self-
citations, namely that scientists increase self-citations to boost the
metric scores when they perceive to have concrete prospects for career
advancement. As a proxy for the perception of future career prospects,
we consider the ratio between new positions created in the next three
years, e.g. as associate professors divided by the current number of
assistant professors:15
Career prospects= (New positions rankx+1 yeari→i+3 disciplinek)/(N.
rankx yeari disciplinek)
We computed the variable both at the national and university level,
assuming that perceptions about future career prospects are affected by
dynamics at both levels. The two variables are highly correlated, and a
factor analysis extracts a unique factor absorbing 70% of the variance,
which we employ as a variable of “career prospects”. We also test the
interaction with the Habilitation variable.
3.6. Analyses
The empirical analysis combines descriptive and inferential statis-
tics.
First, we describe the longitudinal evolution in scientists’ propensity
to self-cite along the four disciplines.
Next, we run regression models to test the factors predicting the
number of self-citations and the change in self-citation behaviour re-
lated to the habilitation process. Since disciplines have distinctive
trends in terms of the evolution of self-citations and responses to me-
trics, we do not pool them in a unique test; instead, we run separate
regressions for each discipline as they provide more accurate results.
The dependent variable is the yearly number of self-citations per article
for each scientist, and it is over dispersed (i.e. the variance increases
faster than the mean). For similar dependent variables, negative bino-
mial regressions are preferred to Poisson regressions because they in-
clude a distinct parameter to model over dispersion (Snijders and
Bosker, 2012).16
The data have a three-level structure, with years nested into scien-
tists, nested within universities. We employ a multilevel regression
model, which disentanlge the variance due to individual and contextual
factors and more accurately computes estimates (Robinson, 2009;
Snijders and Bosker, 2012). Multicollinearity is not a major concern in
our regression models because the average variance inflation factor is
1.82, well below the critical cut-off of ten.
To rule out the possibility that changes in the number of self-cita-
tions are driven by an overlapping general trend, rather than by the
introduction of the habilitation criteria, we adopt a regression dis-
continuity design (RDD) (Imbens and Lemieux, 2008). The use of a RDD
design is motivated by the fact that this quasi-experimental setting uses
15 The variable takes value 0 for all full professors.
16 It is important to remember that binomial regression coefficients are exponential
and multiplicative: if the coefficient for an antecedent is β, then the change in the ex-
pected number of counts for a unit change in the antecedent is given by the exponential of
β. For instance: coefficient 0.375, exponential (0.375)= 1.45, increase +45%.
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ex-post data to evaluate a program’s impact in a context where units are
treated or not, according to a certain threshold in a reference variable.
This methodology is particularly suitable for studying the effects of
regulatory changes because it isolates the effects of the regulatory shift
from the impact of environmental change and other confounding con-
temporaneous events (Lee and Lemieux, 2010). In our setting, the for-
cing variable is the introduction of the habilitation procedure. In other
words, the groups of treated and control researchers are not seen as
homogeneous, but their behaviour is expected to be more similar the
closer they are in time to the introduction of the habilitation procedure.
Following the habilitation, some researchers had a direct incentive to
use self-citations. In this respect, a RDD allows the isolation of differ-
ences in the outcomes between pre and post habilitation periods due to
the causal effect of the treatment. The RDD implies the specification of
models where a p-th order parametric polynomial accounts for the non-
linearity of the relationship between the time trend and the dependent
variable. In particular, we control the counter hypotheses of linear,
quadratic and/or cubic growth throughout the period by introducing a
third order polynomial centred around the years following the event.
The use of a higher order polynomial is discouraged in recent studies
(Gelman and Imbens, 2014).17
Finally, we develop a robustness test using the proportion of self-
citations among the total number of article referencesa published in
yeari by a scientistj as the dependent variable. Hence, we aim to predict
the proportion of self-citations for each year-scientist:
∑
∑
=
−
=
=
P
self citations
references
i j
a
A
a i j
a
A
a i j
,
1 , ,
1 , ,
4. Empirical analysis
4.1. Descriptive statistics
Table 2 displays the descriptive statistics of the selected variables.
The correlations are mostly significant but low, with the exception
of the correlation between the two dependent variables (0.784)
(Table 3). The correlation of the dependent variables with the mean
number of co-authors is positive, yet correlations run per each dis-
cipline are negative or null.
Fig. 1 illustrates the evolution in the number of self-citations per
article between 2002 and 2014 for the four disciplines, for assistant and
associate professors. As to the left side, self-citations have grown in
Applied Economics, however more irregularly and less strongly than in
Economic and Managerial Engineering, where citations have remarkably
grown after the introduction of the habilitation procedure in late 2010.
As to the right side, the growth of self-citations appear to have also
accelerated after 2010 in Psychiatry – especially for associate professors
– as well as in Genetics, although a spike in self-citations occurred in
2009.
Table 2
Descriptive statistics.
variable Min Median Mean Max Standard
Deviation
Self – citations per article 0.00 1.00 1.42 16.18 1.72
Proportion self-citations on references 0.00 0.02 0.03 1.00 0.05
Past production (n. publications) 0 21 37 433 47
N. co-authors 1.00 5.50 6.09 22.00 3.72
Citation standing (normalized) 0.00 0.70 1.23 22.90 1.67
Professional age (years) 0.00 16.00 17.74 59.00 10.79
Group’s Research quality 0.00 1.03 1.04 2.83 0.26
Career prospects: national 0.00 0.07 0.10 0.88 0.12
Career prospects: university 0.00 0.00 0.08 3.00 0.21
rank assistant professors 2.317 40%
associate professors 1.804 31%
full professors 1.659 29%
gender Female 1.978 34%
Male 3.802 66%
Table 3
Pearson correlations.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
1 Self – citations per article 1 0.784** 0.290** 0.150** 0.104** 0.225** 0.258** 0.054** −0.087**
2 Proportion self-citations on references 0.784** 1 0.233** 0.113** 0.011 0.159** 0.247** 0.019 −0.081**
3 Past production (n. publications) 0.290** 0.233** 1 0.270** 0.067** 0.365** 0.478** 0.119** −0.251**
4 N. co-authors 0.150** 0.113** 0.270** 1 0.035** 0.030* 0.300** −0.053** −0.206**
5 Habilitation dummy (year 2011) 0.104** 0.011 0.067** 0.035** 1 −0.033* 0.034** −0.004 0.126**
6 Citation standing (normalized) 0.225** 0.159** 0.365** 0.030* −0.033* 1 0.130** 0.155** 0.049**
7 Professional age (years) - log norm 0.258** 0.247** 0.478** 0.300** 0.034** 0.130** 1 0.046** −0.376**
8 Group's Research quality 0.054** 0.019 0.119** −0.053** −0.004 0.155** 0.046** 1 0.018
9 Career prospects (Factor scores) −0.087** −0.081** −0.251** −0.206** 0.126** 0.049** −0.376** 0.018 1
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
17 The RDD, with time as a forcing variable, mimics a diff-in-diff approach, with the
following advantages: a) the groups of treated and control researchers are not seen as
homogeneous, but the more similar the more they are close (in time) to the introduction
of the habilitation procedure; b) the inclusion of a p-th order parametric polynomial
accounts for non-linearity of the relationship between the time trend and the dependent
variable.
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4.2. Regression analysis
For each discipline, Table 4 presents the results of two multilevel
regression models. The model Habilitation explores the impact of the
habilitation procedure on self-citations by controlling for several pre-
dictors. The model Interactions explores the moderation effects of the
academic rank and the citation standing.
We tested alternative specifications of the habilitation variable with
years 2011, 2012 and 2013 to identify whether and when a significant
increase was observed after the issuing of the law setting the habilita-
tion procedure.18 A significant increase in self-citations for the selected
groups of scientists is observed from 2011 in Economic and Managerial
Engineering and in Psychiatry, and from 2012 in Genetics. Such time
intervals are consistent with the time usually needed from submission
to publication in these fields, which is on average 20 weeks in Psy-
chology, 25 in Economics and Business and longer in Genetics: 35
weeks (Huisman and Smits, 2017; Kareiva et al., 2002). This finding
suggests that scientists have been strongly reactive in changing their
self-citation practices ever since the law was issued.
The results show that in Economic and Managerial Engineering, a
social science discipline that adopts a bibliometric approach, the ha-
bilitation had a strong and significant effect in increasing self-citations,
even at the field level. The estimated effect of the habilitation from
2011 to 2014 is to increase self-citations by 81% (+0.60 self-citations
per article).19 The results of the model Interactions show that the ha-
bilitation procedure has been responsible for a significant growth in
self-citations for assistant (+0.85 self-citations, +179%) associate
(+0.63, +91%) and even full professors (+0.55, +43%), as well as for
scientists that are relatively less cited then their peers.
In Psychiatry and Genetics, disciplines in the Natural Science and
Medicine that adopt a bibliometric approach, the habilitation had a
positive but not a significant effect in increasing self-citations when the
fields as a whole are considered. On the other side, the moderation
terms have a strong and significant effect for assistant professors
(+1.88, +73%) and associate professors (+1.24, +61%) in Psychiatry
and for assistant professors in Genetics (+0.75, +33%),20 and in both
disciplines for scientists that are relatively less cited.
Finally, no significant increase is observed in Applied Economics− a
social science discipline that adopts the non-bibliometric approach –
either at the field level or among the interaction terms with academic
rank and citation standings.
In sum, Hypotheses 1 and Hypotheses 2 are supported to a large
extent by the results of the regressions, as scientists that need to climb
the career ladder – i.e. assistant and associate professors – and those
that are relatively less cited than their peers have responded to the use
of citations to guide career decisions by increasing the number of self-
citations. Hypotheses 3 is also supported by the results, given that the
strongest increase in self-citations – both in the discipline as a whole
and for each academic rank separately – is observed in social sciences
discipline that adopt a bibliometric approach. Table 5 resumes the ex-
pected and observed increase in self-citations.
As to the other predictors, an important remark is that the gender
variable is not significant. While previous studies that observed gender
differences in self-citation propensity included a limited number of
covariates (Hutson, 2006; Maliniak et al., 2013; King et al., 2017), this
result suggests that differences disappear if several covariates are con-
sidered. The professional age is only a significant predictor in Applied
Economics, whereas the group’s research quality is never significant.
Associate and assistant professors tend to self-cite more than full pro-
fessors, with the exception of Genetics. Scientists receiving many cita-
tions self-cite their own work more, except for Applied Economics.
4.3. Robustness test
For the robustness test, we run the ‘Habilitation’ and ‘Interactions’
models for each discipline by employing the ratio between the total
number of self-citations and the total number of references in the ar-
ticles published by a given scientists in year i (Table 6) as the dependent
Fig. 1. Evolution of the number of self-citations per article.
18 Results are available upon request.
19 The exponential of the regression coefficient (0.375) means +45% in comparison to
a hypothetical self-citation rate in 2014 without the habilitation.
20 In Genetics the growth of self-citations for Associate Professors is significant when
considering the proportion of self-citations on total references – see robustness test
(Table 6).
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variable. The results are very similar to the results of the test that used
the average number of self-citations per article as a dependent variable.
The main difference pertains to assistant professors in Genetics, whose
self-citations also increased significantly.
4.4. Impact of self-citations
Fig. 2 illustrates the relative weight of the self-citations compared to
the habilitation threshold in the three bibliometric disciplines, for the
pool of assistant and associate professors. While the contribution in
Psychiatry and Genetics is rather small, self-citations alone provide a
substantial contribution in Economic and Managerial Engineering, and
have increased quickly and strongly after the habilitation procedure
was introduced. In turn, self-citations allow more scientists to meet the
habilitation thresholds in Economic and Managerial Engineering (+18%
for assistant professors and +9% for associate professors, year 2014), in
Genetics (+5% and +4%), and in Psychiatry (+8% for assistant pro-
fessors).
5. Discussion and conclusions
This article explored whether scientists respond to the use of cita-
tions as a formal criterion to drive career decisions by opportunistically
increasing self-citations. We focused in particular on the use of self-
citations, as they can be exploited in a rather short period of time and
be easily detected, thus representing a precious ‘canary in a coal mine’.
The Italian Higher Education system was considered as a forerunner in
the adoption of a national habilitation procedure based on the number
of publications and citations received.
The empirical analysis shows that scientists respond to the use of
citations to guide decisions on academic careers by increasing self-ci-
tations, in particular scientists that are more likely to benefit, namely
assistant and associate professors and professors with fewer citations
when compared to their peers, especially social scientists.
Some choices and assumptions should be discussed. First, some
observers may regard the inflation of self-citations as a minor in-
fringement. However, self-citations have an important impact on visi-
bility, each self-citation generating 3.65 additional citations (Fowler
and Aksnes, 2007) and inflating self-citations is a post-production
malpractice that may undermine trust in the publication system
(Biagioli, 2016), as well as erode confidence in the self-policing cap-
abilities of the academic community. Second, we assume that a rapid
increase in self-citations corresponding to the introduction of the ha-
bilitation procedure is likely indicative of a strategic use of self-cita-
tions, rather than publications becoming more similar in their focus.
Future studies may try to disentangle the two effects. Third, we con-
sidered only one national system. This choice was driven by the fact
that Italy represents a valuable case as a forerunner in adopting a
system-wide, metric-based procedure for guiding career decisions.
The findings have implications on the theoretical understanding of
scientists’ behaviour. Scientists were found to be very responsive to
incentives, as self-citations increased soon after the law on habilitation
was issued, and scientists were keen to adopt a questionable practice
that is beneficial and not sanctioned.
Relevant variations emerge between disciplines among the factors
that predict the propensity to self-cite. Moreover, a multilevel per-
spective highlights that the variability in self-citing behaviour also re-
lated to the university of belonging, suggesting the importance of or-
ganizational norms and habits.
Policy implications emerge in relation to the increasingly wide,
pervasive and formalized use of metrics. Indicators of productivity may
be valuable in assisting evaluation, and they can be helpful to increase
accountability in contexts characterized by a lack of meritocracy.
However, this study suggests that – while metrics are adopted to spur
virtuous behaviours – if not properly designed they favour the diffusion
of questionable practices instead. Therefore, metrics designers should
carefully take into account the strategic nature of scientists. First, self-
citations should not be considered. Second, the value of a citation could
be proportional to the distance (institutional or in the network of au-
thorships) between the citing and cited authors, as a greater distance
between the authors reduces the risk of collusion. Alternatively, addi-
tional citations from the same author would hold a reduced value, e.g.
“one divided by the number of citations already given”. Third, beyond
the number of citations received, also the number of citing documents
and citing authors could be taken into consideration for evaluation
purposes.
In conclusion, this article focused on the use of self-citations, as they
can be easily measured and provide fast benefits. Yet the more aca-
demic rewards become connected to metrics – rather than discovery
achievement – the more research and publication strategies are likely to
become intertwined. Accordingly, two further responses from scientists
can be foreseen in the mid and long term. First, metrics can affect the
balance between exploration and exploitation in scientists’ research
strategies, e.g. towards more specialization and/or small incremental
changes from one publication to another. Second, scientists may be
abandoning themes and types of research that are less cited, such as
theoretical ones, which are cited less than applied ones (Anauati et al.,
2016). Future research should monitor the existence of similar re-
sponses, which would have a direct impact on the production of
knowledge.
Table 5
Comparisons between predicted growth in self-citations and observed growth.
Recruitment Sector Metric approach Scientific Area associate professors (hp 1) assistant professors (hp 1) under cited scientists (hp 2) disciplines (hp 3)
predicted observed pred. obs. pred. obs. pred. obs.
Managerial
Engineering
Bibliometric Social Science yes yes yes yes yes yes strong strong
Psychiatry Bibliometric Medicine yes yes yes yes yes yes less strong less strong
Genetics Bibliometric Natural
Science
yes noa yes yes yes yes less strong less strong
Applied Economics Non-bibliometric Social Science no no no no no no no no
aGrowth is significant when considering the proportion of self-citations – see robustness test (Table 6).
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